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Ronald D. Knutson, Texas A&M University, moderator;
John Keeling,  American Farm Bureau Federation;
Daryll E. Ray, University  of Tennessee.
Ray has done a good analysis of the impacts of the 1996 farm bill, compared
with those of extending the 1990 bill. My task is to evaluate the economic environment
that farmers are likely to face in the next seven years.
Price Expectations
AFPC's price expectations basically are the same as those presented by Ray.
But Table  1 indicates our price expectations from a somewhat broader commodity
and interest cost  perspective.
Specifically, cotton  and  rice have  been two  of the  more  highly subsidized
commodities.  But the projected price pattern  for cotton now looks much like those
for corn, soybeans  and wheat. The  price pattern for rice, on the other hand, looks
quite different.  This  difference  results primarily from the dominance  of the world
market in price determination.
While U.S. rice traditionally has had a world market share of about 20 percent,
it accounts for only about  1 percent of world rice production. The position of U.S.
rice in the world market has been largely a result of subsidies-either directly through
such export-related programs  as P.L. 480 or indirectly through the target price and
marketing loan programs.
The marketing loan program is retained under the  1996 farm bill. But, without
target price, rice production for the export market is in question and certainly will not
be as large as under previous bills. After all, a rice price of around $6 per hundredweight
is not likely to generate the production levels that existed under the  1990 farm bill.
Hay would not normally be  in a  farm program commodity price projection.
Previously, farmers could not flex to hay. Moreover, they could not utilize Conservation
Reserve Program (CRP) land to produce hay unless there was a disaster declaration.
The 1996 farm bill is the first to recognize flexibility to hay production as a legitimate
use of land on which payments can be made. Implied by the projected price movements
for hay is the notion that a larger number of farmers will find hay to be an attractive
alternative-at least until about the turn of the century.
The  implications of high  feed  prices  for  livestock  and poultry  are  easily
overlooked.  For example,  milk producers who buy feed are caught  in a cost-price
squeeze.  On the other hand, those who raise their own feed are doing quite well-
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Year  Corn  Soybeans  Wheat  Cotton  Rice  Hay  Milk  Interest
Rate
- - - - - - - $ per unit --------
1996  3.21  7.31  4.25  0.7082  8.04  77.64  14.44  7.90
1997  2.43  6.57  3.55  0.6491  8.29  74.96  14.13  7.75
1998  2.33  5.66  3.40  0.6424  8.18  71.45  13.49  7.75
1999  2.27  5.55  3.48  0.6171  7.75  66.09  13.77  7.81
2000  2.34  5.53  3.51  0.6131  8.03  64.45  13.10  7.68
2001  2.32  5.64  3.27  0.6395  8.02  62.81  13.03  7.42
2002  2.43  5.78  3.22  0.6185  8.09  63.62  13.02  7.12
albeit not as well as they would be doing if they had sold their crop at market highs.
But then relatively few farmers are successful in selling at the market high.
Flexibility Impacts
The most frequently asked question of AFPC involves  what is going  to be
produced and where is it going to be produced under the flexibility provisions of the
1996 farm bill. Our analyses suggest the following for crops:
*  Midwest.  Corn  is king  in the  Corn  Belt. The  Midwest has  an absolute
advantage  in corn over the  rest of the  country-and  perhaps  the  world.
Marginal increases in corn acreage may be seen in the Midwest as ineligible
CRP land exits the program. But there will be larger increases in soybean
acreage, as farmers shore up their crop rotation patterns.
*  Great Plains. There will be more corn, sorghum and soybean production in
the Great Plains. From Nebraska on south, preference will be given to corn
in areas where water is available. But sorghum production will come back, as
Mexico returns to the market. The northern Plains will see some substitution
of wheat for barley, but  whether the United States can effectively compete
with Canada in barley production is an increasing question.
*  Texas.  When considered separately from the Great Plains, Texas appears
likely to experience  reduced cotton and rice acreage. Corn and sorghum will
be the most attractive alternatives.
*  Southeast. While cotton production has returned to the Southeast, its future
is questionable.  Corn production  will increase,  where  feasible.  Double
cropping  of wheat and soybeans also will  work in some regions.  Cotton
production will decrease, but the question is:  How much?
*  Delta. The  Delta has the  most varied cropping options of any  major U.S.
101multi-state  area.  Still,  corn production there  can be expected to jump, as
cotton and rice decline.
West.  Less barley, cotton and rice are a virtual certainty for the West. The
decline in cotton and rice production could be substantial. What happens to
rice is heavily dependent on Japanese and Korean import policies. Increased
wheat, corn and hay acreages in the West could be fairly evenly distributed.
These are short- and intermediate-run projections. But what will happen in the
long run is interesting speculation. Global competition plays a more important role in
the long-run outlook. And that competition is governed, in part, by progress toward
freer trade.
How globally competitive  are we? Here are my thoughts:
*  Corn. The United States has an absolute advantage.
*  Soybeans.  The  United  States  shares  the  export  market  with Brazil  and
Paraguay. We are strong, but do not have an absolute advantage.
*  Wheat. The United States already has several significant competitors,  and
Eastern European countries are becoming more viable competition.
*  Sorghum. As water decreases in availability and cost, sorghum will replace
corn in drier production areas. It will help sustain U.S. dominance in feed
grains.
*  Barley. We will not be a significant  global player and may become  a net
importer.
*  Rice. We will only produce to satisfy domestic needs.
*  Sugar. With  free trade,  U.S.  production  will vanish,  except in the  most
efficient growing areas.
*  Cotton.  Who  knows?  The  former  Soviet Republics  and China  are such
important unknowns in this market that it is difficult to project where U.S.
producers will stand in the long run. It seems doubtful that U.S. cotton will
rebound to the production acreages that existed under the 1973 to  1995 farm
programs. If it does, technology on dryland production probably will be the
key to competitiveness.
These are bold conclusions that are subject to challenge. They deserve discussion
and dialogue among Extension economists across the United States. What production
patterns will be under a free market is a key issue for the future.
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